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Abstract
Evolutionary stability is a necessary condition for imitative dynamics of policy learn-
ing and innovation to come to a rest. We apply this concept to profit tax competition
in a regime where a common and consolidated profit tax base for multi-jurisdictional
firms is divided among governments by means of formulary apportionment. In evo-
lutionary play, governments exhibit aggregate-taking behavior: when comparing
their performance with others, they ignore their impact on the consolidated tax
base. Consequently, evolutionarily stable tax rates are less efficient than tax rates
in best-response tax competition.
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1 Introduction
In 2016, the European Union (EU) launched another effort to abandon its fragmented
collection of 28 competing tax laws and separate accounting for corporate income taxation.
Building on earlier suggestions, the recent proposal is to use a method of formulary
apportionment (FA) applied to a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)
that aggregates the EU-wide profits of multinational groups which operate firms in EU
member states.1 While a number of federal countries – most prominent: Canada, the US,
Switzerland and Germany – have since long been using apportionment methods to share
between their jurisdictions the base for profit taxes (e.g., Siu et al., 2014; Hellerstein and
McLure, 2004), moving to the formulary apportionment of a consolidated aggregate tax
base for corporate income would be a big step into an unfamiliar tax territory for the EU.
If the proposal came true, how should governments set their tax rates – which, for rea-
sons of national sovereignty in the EU, remain policy instruments in their hands? Almost
all (theoretical) research on formulary apportionment presupposes that tax rates would
be set optimally, i.e., as payoff-maximizing, best responses to what other governments
do. Corporate income taxation in an economically integrated area is, thus, viewed as a
non-cooperative game with the Nash equilibrium as the predicted outcome.
The informational requirements underlying best-response play are unrealistically de-
manding. In particular, for optimization governments need to fully know the mapping
1Explorations into the CCCTB started with European Commission (2001), came to a halt in 2008, and
rather unsuccessfully reappeared on the policy agenda of European Commission and European Parliament
in 2011. In October 2016, the European Commission proposed another set of Directives pushing forward
unitary tax rules for business operations across the EU European Commission (2016). If adopted, a
common corporate tax base (CCTB) becomes mandatory, as of January 2019, for EU companies belonging
to a group with a consolidated turnover exceeding EUR 750 million. In a second step, the cross-border
consolidation of profits and losses will become mandatory from January 2021 onwards, transforming the
CCTB into a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) with formula apportionment of taxable
group profits based on three equally weighted factors comprising labor (half allocated to payroll and half
to number of employees), assets (all fixed tangible assets, but not intangible or financial assets), and sales
(by destination). The rationale of the CCCTB is to remedy the multiple defects of income taxation for
multinationals in the EU that mainly originate from the co-existence of so many different and inconsistent
tax systems. These defects result in distorted factor allocations, high administrative and compliance costs,
tax avoidance through cross-border profit shifting and transfer pricing, thin capitalization etc. which
consolidation and formula apportionment are hoped to remedy (European Commission, 2001, 2003, 2006,
2011, 2016; Devereux, 2004; Sørensen, 2004; Weiner, 2006; Fuest, 2008; Avi-Yonah and Benshalom, 2011).
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from tax policies to (expected) payoffs. This requires that the “true” economic structure
is well-understood and parametrically accurate, including mobility elasticities, policy im-
pacts, international spillovers, strategic interaction effects etc. The novelty of formulary
apportionment in the EU, but possibly also the complexity of formulary apportionment
in general render assumptions that governments possess enough knowledge to craft best-
response policies implausible (Arel-Bundock and Parinandi, 2017).2
Alternative approaches to fiscal decentralization precisely take such a lack of knowledge
as their starting point. For them, the rationale for running economic systems in a decen-
tralized way rather than through top-down social planning is that knowledge on how the
economy is working is not available or, at least, insufficient to run optimization routines
in government finance. Centralized, one-size-fits-all policies would then carry a high risk
of damaging the entire system by bad policy choices. By contrast, fiscal decentraliza-
tion limits eventual damages to a smaller scale. More importantly, it works like a set of
laboratories; fiscal interaction is a discovery procedure that evolves through experimenta-
tion, learning-by-doing and the imitation of good ideas (Hayek, 1978; Oates, 1999, 2008;
North, 1981; Kollman et al., 2000; Vanberg and Kerber, 1994; Vihanto, 1992; Baybeck et
al., 2011).
In this paper, we analyse tax competition with formulary apportionment of a common
tax base from such an evolutionary perspective. Specifically, we have in mind “best-
practice”-processes like this: governments are in repeated interaction over a long period
of time. They observe each others’ policies (tax rates, say) and the attending outcomes
(tax revenues). They do not comprehend the “true” economy; when considering changes
in their policy, governments most of the time adopt the policy (i.e., set the rate of the
corporate income tax) that, in the previous period, worked best in the set of all countries
2Empirical knowledge on firm behaviour, tax planning, and the effects of changes in tax rates and
sharing mechanisms under formulary apportionment is scarce, however, relative to separate accounting.
In addition, studies are often confined to (sub-)national contexts in the USA (e.g., Edmiston and Arze del
Granado, 2006), Canada (e.g., Mintz and Smart, 2004), or Germany (e.g., Riedel, 2010), making transfers
to international settings problematic. Lacking historical data, predictions on tax revenues under FA are
based on simulation models (Devereux and Loretz, 2008; Fuest et al., 2007; Bettendorf et al., 2010;
Spengel et al., 2012).
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(imitate-the-best). Occasionally, governments try new policies (experimentation). Such
experiments will be copied by other governments and thus spread out if they are “success-
ful”; otherwise they will be discarded and undone. “Successful” is understood in terms
of relative comparisons : only if deviators (i.e., experimenting, innovating jurisdictions)
earn higher payoffs than non-deviators will their policies spread out. In the long run,
so the theory of laboratory federalism hopes, this process of innovation, learning, and
mimicking will lead, in a decentralized way, to the adoption of superior, if not efficient
policies everywhere.
Building on game-theoretical results on learning and imitation dynamics (Fudenberg
and Imhof, 2006; Alo´s-Ferrer and Schlag, 2009), recent attempts to formalize laboratory
federalism argue that the iterated process of policy experimentation and imitation will
eventually stochastically converge to so-called evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of the
underlying static stage game. A policy is called an ESS if, once it has been adopted by all
governments, it cannot be successfully taken over by the emergence of an alternative policy
(Schaffer, 1988) in the sense that a deviator would be better off than a non-deviator.3
In finite-player games – like fiscal federalism or tax competition –, an ESS is generally
neither a Nash equilibrium strategy nor efficient. In fact, in large classes of games ESS
leads to “competitive” outcomes (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania, 2005): players behave as if they
had no impact on the aggregates of the economy, i.e., governments ignore all effects of
their policies on economic variables that are common to the entire set of governments.
The rationale is that, if governments base policy choices on payoff comparisons among
themselves, all aggregate effects are irrelevant – precisely because they affect every player
in the same way. Such “aggregate-taking behavior” leads, in many cases, to extremely
sharp races to the bottom or over the top, amplifying the inefficiencies already prevailing
in best-response play.4
3An additional piece of motivation comes from the fact that an ESS is the predicted Nash equilibrium
strategy when players aim at maximizing their relative (rather than absolute) payoffs. For models of
fiscal competition, this captures yardstick competition and other policies inspired by keeping up with
other governments.
4Observations of highly inefficient ESS have been made for several standard models of fiscal decentral-
ization such as capital tax competition (Sano, 2012; Wagener, 2013; Philipowski, 2015), infrastructure
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In tax competition with formulary apportionment, such inefficiencies arise from spillovers
generated both by the apportionment method and the definition of the tax base. Their in-
terplay also shapes strategic incentives in best-response tax competition, which may be of
the “race-to-the-bottom” type as well as of the “race-over-the-top” type (e.g., Sørensen,
2004; Eggert and Schjelderup, 2003; Wellisch, 2004; Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Pinto,
2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2011, 2012).5
In this paper we, first, find that the ESS of tax competition with tax-base apportionment
only depends on the apportionment formula – and not (so much)6 on the definition of
the consolidated tax base. Second, comparing the ESS, the Nash equilibrium and the
cooperative outcome of the tax competition game, all three solutions generally differ. If
the fiscal game exhibits positive [negative] externalities, then the ESS tax rate is lower
[higher] than the Nash equilibrium rate, which in turn is lower [higher] than the efficient
tax rate. Evolutionary play, thus, exacerbates the inefficiencies of best-response play. In
the knife-edge case where the tax base and apportionment are designed in such a way
that fiscal externalities are internalized, then the ESS and the Nash equilibrium are the
same – and both are efficient. In such an ideal situation, the outcome of fiscal interaction
would be independent of how governments play the fiscal game: as sophisticated rational
agents or as behavioral and learning agents.
Our paper adds to the literature on the CCCTB-project of the EU, where evolutionary
play and relative payoff concerns have not yet been studied. Our approach and findings
are, however, not tied to this project and its uncertain prospects; they carry over to other
tax settings with formulary apportionment as well. They in fact generally apply to all
situations where an aggregate tax base or, more broadly, a common pool resource is to
be divided among several governments and the value of the resource and/or the division
competition (Wagener, 2013) or decentralized redistribution (Ania and Wagener, 2016).
5Tax competition with formulary apportionment indeed looks quite different than “standard” tax
competition with separate accounts, the status-quo of EU corporate income taxation. Separate accounting
encourages firms to shift taxable profits into low-tax countries, implying positive fiscal cross-border
externalities of corporate income taxes (Nielsen et al., 2010).
6The definition of taxable profits only matters to the extent that it affects the elasticity of total
investment in the economic area. With a fixed capital stock it would not matter at all.
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method are endogenous to the players’ choices (Konrad, 2008). To demonstrate this, we
start our exposition in Section 2 with a general model of a shared common tax resource,
which only in Section 4 will be fleshed out to a model of tax competition with a CCCTB.
Our paper adds to a growing literature on policy diffusion and learning by govern-
ments. Different than the tax competition literature, which views tax policy interdepen-
dence as solely strategic, policy diffusion scholars suggest a variety of interdependence
mechanisms, including learning, imitation, competition, coercion, common norms, and
taken-for-grantedness, in addition to competition (Shipan and Volden, 2008; Maggetti
and Gilardi, 2016). They define “learning” as a process where policies in one jurisdiction
are influenced by the consequences of similar policies in other jurisdictions; policy adop-
tion is more likely if the policy has been successful elsewhere (Meseguer, 2010; Volden,
2016).7 Political actors are routinely assumed to learn about the success or failure of
a policy in other states, but behave in a “boundedly rational” way, relying on heuris-
tics or behavioural rules rather than on optimization; adopting best practices is one of
such heuristics. Empirical evidence that governments learn from each other in the sense
just described is, for example, provided in Meseguer (2010), Volden (2006) or Jensen and
Lindsta¨dt (2012). Policy diffusion has been observed in a wide range of policy areas, rang-
ing from codes of good governance to environmental policy instruments to social security
reforms (Graham et al., 2013). Examples from tax policy include Leiser (2015), Arel-
Bundock and Parinandi (2017) or Jensen and Lindsta¨dt (2012).8 Theoretical analyses
are surprisingly scarce, however. Volden et al. (2008) study policy diffusion when policy
options binary. In Glick (2014), social learning can resolve uncertainty about policy out-
comes; tax mimicking then indicates a tendency towards efficiency. In Becker and Davies
(2015), governments gradually learn about the true elasticity of their tax base; they play
a best-response game. By observing its own and its neighboring countries’ outcomes, a
7In an experimental study, Tyran and Sausgruber (2005) show that providing political decision-makers
with information about policy innovations in other jurisdictions speeds up the diffusion of (efficiency-
enhancing) policies.
8Li (2002) argues that the concept of formulary allocation of a global tax base itself “evolves” from the
historical development of the arm’s-length principle. However, “evolutionary” here refers to non-sudden,
incremental changes to the existing system, and is only loosely related to learning and imitation.
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country updates its belief function; eventually Bayesian updating leads to full knowledge,
and the classical inefficiencies of tax competition will prevail. Our paper differs from these
studies by focusing on imitation under a behavioural rule, using a non-binary (continu-
ous) policy space and not using a knowledge-based interpretation of learning. Under this
premise, we predict outcomes to be worse than in tax competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up a general model of inter-
acting governments that apportion a common and endogenous tax base among themselves.
Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 spells out the general model of Section 2
for a specific setting with international investments in the spirit of the CCCTB approach.
In Section 5 we change government objectives from tax revenue maximization to welfare
maximization and show that our principal insights fully carry over. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Formulary apportionment of a common tax base
2.1 Set-up
Our main points can be made in a generic setting of fiscal interactions between a set of (na-
tional) governments that shares a common and aggregate tax base (say, the consolidated
taxable profits of multinational groups active in their jurisdictions). Each government
can only tax a fraction of this tax base, and fractions are determined by a formula-based
apportionment method. Both the size of the tax base and the assigned shares vary with
governments’ policy choices (i.e., tax rates).
In Section 4 we provide a full-fledged model of profit taxation with formula apportion-
ment. Here, we present its core of taxing a common-pool resource of endogenous value
and with endogenous division. This set-up captures the reduced form for a variety of insti-
tutionally and economically richer environments where fiscal outcomes can be traced back
to the tax-affected choices and business activities of multinational firms (or other taxpay-
ers). We look at fiscal interaction from the perspective of its players (i.e., governments)
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and model payoffs directly as functions of their policy instruments.
As a policy objective, we assume that governments only care for their (national) tax
revenues out of the common tax base. This Leviathan perspective is less restrictive than it
appears: as long as governments’ objectives are related to tax revenues, our main insights
fully carry over (see Section 5 for welfare maximization).9
We consider a common market with n ≥ 2 identical small open economies, called
countries and variably indexed by i, j, k = 1, . . . , n. We aggregate the corporate sector
into a single representative multinational group that operates firms in all countries in the
common market.
The multinational group has to pay profit taxes to the governments of all countries
where it operates. The countries operate with a commonly agreed and consolidated base,
Φ, for taxing profits. We will henceforth assume that the multinational’s taxable profits
are always positive: Φ > 0.10
The tax base Φ is shared between the nn countries following a method of formulary
apportionment (FA). A certain fraction of the consolidated tax base Φ is assigned to
each country. These fractions are meant to reflect how the multinational firm allocates
its activities across countries. In a more complete model, these activities could, e.g., be
represented by the share of its total capital that the multinational invests in the countries
or by some other business-related factors (payroll, sales, etc.). Generally, we denote by
αi ∈ [0, 1] the (endogenous) share of tax revenues assigned to country i; the vector of
shares is α = (α1, . . . , αn). Shares invariably add up to unity across countries: in any
circumstance,
n∑
j=1
αj = 1.
The statutory profit tax rate in country i is denoted by ti; we assume that for all i,
ti ∈ [0, t¯] for some t¯ < 1; these keeps strategy spaces compact and precludes expropriation.
9In the context of the CCCTB in the EU, the rather parochial debate among policy makers almost
exclusively focus(ed) on the possible consequences for the tax proceeds in their country; all other benefits
and costs of the proposal are largely ignored.
10Losses and loss-offsets are a thorny issue for formulary apportionment, which we choose to avoid
here. See, e.g., Ge´rard and Weiner (2006) or Mardan and Stimmelmayr (2017).
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We collect tax rates in vectors t = (t1, . . . , tn). To single out one country, we shall
sometimes write t = (ti; t−i). With FA, the tax revenues in country i amount to
Ti = ti · αi · Φ. (1)
Denote by
τ :=
∑
i
ti · αi
the effective tax rate on the firm’s worldwide profits; tax payments (and thus tax proceeds)
total τΦ.
Taxable profits and the distribution of apportionment shares depend on the firm’s
choices (investments, hiring, sales etc.). At this point, we do not need to introduce
any specific model of corporate decision-making (in Section 4 we will consider maximiza-
tion of after-tax profits).11 We assume, however, that in its choices the firm takes into
account tax rates and tax rules. While from the firm’s perspective statutory tax rates
t are parametrically fixed, the effective tax rate τ is endogenous to the firm’s decisions
since the apportionment shares αi depend on the firm’s activities.
Given an apportionment formula and a definition for taxable profits, the firm’s choices
and, consequently, gross profits and taxable profits will vary with tax rates, t. We write the
resulting volume of taxable profits, Φ, and of the apportionment shares, αi, as functions
that depend (only) on t:
Φ = Φ(t), and αi = αi(t) for i = 1, . . . , n.
As countries are identical and do not differ as locations except, possibly, in their tax rates,
the following symmetry properties for profits and apportionment shares appear natural:
• if t′ is a permutation of t, then Φ(t) = Φ(t′);
• if t′−i is a permutation of t−i, then αi(ti; t−i) = αi(ti; t′−i) for all i, ti, t−i;
11We assume a centralized multinational group, where one management makes the decision for all
international divisions of the firm.
8
• if ti = tj, then αi(ti; t−i) = αj(tj; t−j).
Thus, for the firm, it is only relevant which tax rates are set, but not by whom. Similarly,
from any country’s perspective, the identities of the other countries do not matter for its
tax share; again it is only relevant which tax rates are set, but not by whom: relabeling the
other countries would not change the value of the apportionment factor, and countries
with the same tax rate are assigned identical base shares. These symmetry properties
reflect an equal treatment of countries both in the definition of the consolidated tax base
and the apportionment method.
In what follows we will often consider symmetric situations, i.e., situations where all
countries set identical tax rates (in evolutionary parlance: “monomorphic states”): ti = t
in all i. With 1n = (1, . . . , 1) as the vector of n ones, such tax situations will be written
as t = t · 1n. In a symmetric situation the tax base is shared equally between countries:
αi(t · 1n) = 1/n for all t. Moreover, as the apportionment shares add up to unity across
countries,
∂αi(t · 1n)
∂ti
= −(n− 1)∂αj(t · 1
n)
∂ti
(2)
holds for all j 6= i.
For our reduced form approach, we do not make any monotonicity assumptions on
functions Φ(t) and αi(t). Our analysis allows taxable profits and apportionment shares
to move into any direction when (domestic or foreign) tax rates vary. In fact, previous
research has shown that, depending on the model of the multinational firm, many things
can happen with formula apportionment.
2.2 Payoffs and solutions
Tax revenues in each country depend, via the firm’s optimal choices, on the entire tax
vector:
Ti(t) = T (ti; t−i) = ti · αi(ti; t−i) · Φ(t).
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By our previous assumptions, tax revenues are symmetric functions: Ti(ti; t−i) = Ti(ti; t′−i)
if t′−i is a permutation of t−i. Assuming that they all exist and are unique, we consider
the following solutions:
Definition 1 Suppose that a method (α1(t), . . . , αn(t)) of formulary apportionment is
applied to a well-defined consolidated tax base Φ(t). Then:
• A symmetric cooperative solution is a tax rate t∗ that, when applied everywhere,
maximizes joint tax revenues:
∑
j
Tj(t
∗ · 1n) ≥
∑
j
Tj(t · 1n) for all t.
• A tax rate tN is played in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tax
competition game if
Ti(t
N · 1n) ≥ Ti(t; tN · 1n−1) for all t, i.
• A tax rate tE is said to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if
Tj(t
E; t, tE · 1n−2) ≥ Ti(t; tE · 1n−1) for all t, i, j.
In a cooperative solution, the total of tax revenues is maximized. In a Nash equilib-
rium, no country can earn higher tax revenues from a unilateral deviation, given the tax
choices of the other countries. At an evolutionarily stable profile no country can gain a
strict relative advantage over any other country from deviating; the payoff comparison is
between the (single) deviator, who chooses policy t, and the non-deviators, who all stick
to tE. An ESS can be understood as the Nash equilibrium when governments care about
their relative performance (Schaffer, 1988). Formally, an ESS then is a strategy tE such
that
tE = arg max
t
[
Ti(t; t
E, . . . , tE)− Tj(tE; t, tE, . . . , tE)
]
. (3)
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If the ESS is unique and interior, it is determined by the following FOCs:
∂(Ti − Tj)
∂ti
=
∂
∂ti
[
Ti(t; t
E · 1n−1)− Tj(tE; t, tE · 1n−2)
]∣∣∣∣
t=tE
= 0
for all i, j (Tanaka, 2000). A finite-population ESS generally is neither a cooperative solu-
tion nor a Nash equilibrium strategy of the “absolute” game (Schaffer, 1988; Hehenkamp
et al., 2010). Deviating from a Nash equilibrium may pay off in relative terms even if it
reduces absolute payoffs. Sano (2012), Wagener (2013) or Philipowski (2015) show this
for standard tax competition games.
The ESS is a static, one-shot concept. Recall, however, that when the interaction
between government occurs repeatedly over a long horizon and takes the form of imitation-
cum-experimentation dynamics, the evolutionary stability of a strategy in the stage game
is a necessary condition for that strategy to be a rest point (technically, a stochastically
stable state) of the imitation dynamics (Alo´s-Ferrer and Schlag, 2009). In models of fiscal
interaction, the ESS is, thus, the theoretically predicted outcome of laboratory federalism
with its learning and innovation processes.
3 General results
3.1 Characterization
Define by
εΦ(t) := − t
Φ(t · 1n) ·
∂Φ(t · 1n)
∂ti
and εα(t) := −nt · ∂αi(t · 1
n)
∂ti
the elasticities of, respectively, the tax base and the apportionment share with respect
to a tax rate, evaluated at a symmetric situation (recall that αi = 1/n then). Due to
symmetry, these elasticities do not depend on the index i of the tax rate that changes.
For interior symmetric solutions (i.e., ti = t ∈ (0, t¯) for all i) in the reduced form of tax
competition under FA we get the following result:
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Proposition 1 • An interior symmetric cooperative solution t∗ is characterized by
εΦ(t
∗) =
1
n
. (4)
• An interior symmetric Nash equilibrium tN is characterized by
εΦ(t
N) + εα(t
N) = 1. (5)
• An interior ESS tE is characterized by
εα(t
E) = 1− 1
n
. (6)
Condition (4) in the first item of Proposition 1 is the standard condition on the tax
elasticity of the tax base for the maximum of a Laffer curve.12 Condition (5) in the second
item conveys that in a Nash equilibrium each government balances the direct revenue
effects of a change in its tax rate (on the LHS) against a formula effect, encompassing
that a tax change also affects the fraction of corporate profits assigned to the country.
The ESS condition (6) in the third item deserves closer inspection. It is, evaluated in
a symmetric situation, the first-order condition for maximizing (αiti − αjtj), i.e., the
condition to maximize the gap between country i’s and country j’s tax claim on the
common consolidated tax base. This reflects the relative payoff concerns inherent in an
ESS: each country strives to get ahead of the others as far as possible – and this works
via appropriating a relatively larger share of the tax cake.
Condition (6) refers to an interior ESS. Obviously, it necessitates ∂αi
∂ti
< 0, i.e., that
increasing the tax rate in a country diminishes the share of the common tax base attributed
to this country. Below we will discuss the economic prerequisites for such an effect. As
the proof of the third item of Proposition 1 makes clear, no interior ESS can exist if the
apportionment exhibits ∂αi
∂ti
≥ 0 everywhere; then the ESS will be the maximum tax rate.
12Observe that in a symmetric situation a single tax rate ti only impacts on the total tax rate by a
factor 1/n.
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Proposition 1 conveys a number of important messages. First and evidently, the three
solutions generally differ from one another: efficiency, Nash equilibrium and ESS do not
coincide. Second, in reduced form, for the cooperative solution only the tax base, Φ(t),
matters; the apportionment formula (represented by the αi) is irrelevant. The reason
is that the apportionment only determines the distribution of tax revenues; from the
perspective of joint revenue maximization this sharing is, however, irrelevant. For the
ESS this is exactly the other way round: only the apportionment method, represented by
αi(t), matters, the dependence of the tax base on t is irrelevant. The intuition is that
the tax base is common to all countries and, thus, does not affect the relative positions of
countries vis-a`-vis each other; only the apportionment factor determines relative payoffs.
The Nash equilibrium depends on both the apportionment method and the tax base
definition – simply as both these elements affect national tax revenues.
It is important to note that these statements refer to reduced definitions of tax base and
apportionment shares, understood as functions of tax rates, t. In practice, neither Φ nor
the αi are defined in terms of tax rates but rather in terms of the firm’s activities. We
will return to this in Section 4.
3.2 Comparison of solutions
Given our assumption that the cooperative solution is unique, we obtain that a Nash
equilibrium tax rate tN is too high [too low], relative to t∗, if a negative [positive] fiscal
externality prevails:
∂Tj(t
N · 1n)
∂ti
≤ 0 for i 6= j ⇐⇒ tN ≥ t∗. (7)
Due to symmetry, this condition will be simultaneously met or violated in all countries.
Proposition 2 At a symmetric Nash equilibrium tN a positive fiscal externality prevails
(i.e., tN < t∗) if
εα(t
N) > 1− 1
n
. (8)
13
Proposition 2 reiterates the general insight that tax competition under formula appor-
tionment can cause both races over the top and to the bottom, depending on how the
apportionment method and the common tax base are designed (Pethig and Wagener,
2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2012).13
Equations (8) and (6) reveal an interesting feature: the condition that fiscal externalities
are zero is identical to the FOC for an ESS. Hence,
Proposition 3 If the Nash equilibrium coincides with the cooperative outcome under for-
mulary apportionment, then it is an ESS: if tN = t∗, then tE = tN .
Technically, this striking result comes from a general observation in Hehenkamp et
al. (2010, Corollary 2): for all symmetric games with differentiable payoffs Ti and com-
pact strategy sets, equality of Nash equilibrium and ESS (tN = tE) necessitates that
∂Tj(t
N · 1n)/∂ti = 0 for all j 6= i. Since a symmetric Nash equilibrium itself satisfies
∂Ti(t
N · 1n)/∂ti = 0 for all i, identity of Nash equilibrium and ESS implies the coopera-
tive outcome: ∂/∂ti
(∑
k Tk(t
N · 1n)) = 0.
Proposition 3 conveys that an apportionment method and a tax base definition that
together internalize fiscal externalities in Nash play also render the ESS efficient. Hence,
if the social planner manages to construct an efficient apportionment mechanism (in the
sense that best-response play leads to a cooperative outcome), imitation-cum-experimen-
tation dynamics would, in the long run, also implement cooperative outcomes. Such
efficient mechanisms do indeed exist (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007, Prop. 4), but
they are knife-edge cases.
If the cooperative outcome is not known (neither to the FA designer nor to national
governments), fiscal externalities are likely to remain non-internalized. In these cases, the
three solutions can be ranked:
13Kolmar and Wagener (2007) show that tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates if and only
if the investment elasticity of the tax base is lower than the investment elasticity for the apportionment
factor. This fully accords with the results to come.
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Proposition 4 In the presence of positive revenue externalities (i.e., if
∂Tj(t)
∂ti
> 0 for all
t and i 6= j),
tE < tN < t∗.
In the presence of negative revenue externalities, this ranking reverses.
Proposition 4 states that evolutionary play amplifies the inefficiencies that already pre-
vail under Nash play: both races over the top and to the bottom are sped up. The intuition
is straightforward (see, e.g., Wagener, 2013): under relative performance concerns, each
government can increase its relative standing by increasing its own payoff and by reducing
that of others. If externalities are positive [negative] the second, spiteful motive adds an
incentive to further lower [increase] one’s tax rate beyond what the first motive – which
matters under Nash play – dictates.
4 A model with international investments
4.1 General
So far, our analysis dealt with an abstract and reduced-form economy. To flesh out our
approach, this section offers a more specific model that explicitly takes into account firm
behaviour in a CCCTB framework.
Suppose that the multinational group aims to maximize its worldwide profits, net of
taxes. As usual, net profits are gross economic profits minus tax payments, τΦ. Taxable
profits, Φ most likely differ from gross economic profits due to non-deductible expenses,
tax-depreciation rules, exemptions, allowances, valuation rules, the in- or exclusion of
unrealized incomes and many other details. Such divergences generally imply the non-
neutrality of profit taxation.
The multinational pursues its aim by deciding how much capital, ki, to invest in each
country i = 1, . . . , n of its operations. Other business decisions (such as hiring labor,
choosing sales levels, setting prices etc.) are ignored for simplicity. Investment decisions
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are summarized in k = (k1, . . . , kn); we write k = (ki; k−i) if we need to distinguish
country i from other countries. Denote total investments by
K :=
∑
j
kj.
We assume that total economic gross profits of the multinational, Π˜g, depend in a sym-
metric way on investments,
Π˜g : Rn+ → R with k 7→ Π˜g(k),
where Π˜g(k) = Π˜g(k′) if k′ is a permutation of k. We assume that Π˜g takes on strictly
positive values (at least) over some subset of Rn+. Likewise, in this expanded version of
the model, we assume that taxable profits Φ˜ depend on investments k: Φ˜ = Φ˜(k); the
relation of Φ˜(k) to Φ(t) from Section 2 will be made clear below. As with gross profits,
Φ˜ is assumed to be a symmetric function.
Apportionment maps the firm’s activities into shares of the tax base Φ˜; it is represented
by symmetric functions
α˜i = α˜(ki; k−i).
We assume that
• apportionment shares always add up to unity: ∑j α˜j = 1 for all k;
• a country’s share of the tax base increases with the amount of the investment in its
jurisdiction, i.e.,
∂α˜(ki; k−i)
∂ki
> 0
for all k. By symmetry and the adding-up property, this implies that ∂α˜(ki;k−i)
∂kj
< 0
for all j 6= i.
The simplest and most prominent example of an apportionment method is property share
16
apportionment:
α˜i = ki/K.
Other examples from practice such as sales apportionment or payroll apportionment show
that apportionment methods often are generalized weights,
α˜i(k) =
g(ki)∑
k g(kk)
, (9)
where g(ki) is a suitably defined function that maps investments (as a proxy for the firm’s
activities in country i) into sales, payroll or whatever. For example, all components of
the so-called Massachusetts formula are of this type (Gordon and Wilson, 1986).
The multinational firm maximizes, by choice of k, its net profits,
Π˜n(k) = Π˜g(k)− τ Φ˜(k),
where τ =
∑
j tjα˜j as before denotes the total tax rate. We assume that Π˜
n(k) is pseudo-
concave in k, such that the optimal investment behaviour satisfies the FOCs,
0 =
∂Π˜n
∂ki
=
∂Π˜g
∂ki
− τ · ∂Φ˜
∂ki
− Φ˜(k) · ∂τ
∂ki
for i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
Here,
∂τ
∂ki
=
∑
j
tj · ∂α˜j
∂ki
captures the change in the effective tax rate, τ , which the multinational can induce via
the apportionment shares. Condition (10) tells us that, with formula apportionment,
taxation not only affects factor demand through its direct effect on net marginal profits
(the first and second term on the RHS), but also indirectly via the apportionment method
(the third term on the RHS). The firm accounts for the (positive or negative) dependence
of its effective tax rate on its input choices.
The set of equations in (10) determines investments as a function of tax rates: k = k(t).
Plugging this into Φ˜ and the α˜i yields the functions Φ(t) and αi(t) that we used in the
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previous sections. In particular, we get
∂αi(t)
∂ti
=
∑
j
∂α˜i
∂kj
∂kj
∂ti
and
∂Φ(t)
∂ti
=
∑
j
∂Φ˜
∂kj
∂kj
∂ti
. (11)
The multinational’s responses to tax changes under formulary apportionment are quite
complex in general; as previous research has shown, they can go in any direction, depend-
ing on the definition of the tax base, Φ˜, and the apportionment method, α˜. For sym-
metric situations, expressions for the direct (∂ki(t · 1n)/∂ti) and the cross-border effects
(∂ki(t · 1n)/∂tj) of tax increases are provided in Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9) in Appendix A.4.
4.2 Symmetric situations
Proposition 1 highlighted the importance of the tax elasticities of apportionment share
and tax base definition. In our more specific model, these tax elasticities can be traced
back to the direct properties of apportionment method tax base and the tex responses of
investments.
Let us again focus on symmetric situations where ti = t for all i. Then τ = t and
αi = 1/n. From (10) and the symmetry of Φ˜ and Π˜
g, investment levels are the same
everywhere (ki = kj) and comparative statics are also symmetric:
∂ki(t · 1n)
∂ti
=
∂kj(t · 1n)
∂tj
and
∂ki(t · 1n)
∂tj
=
∂kj(t · 1n)
∂ti
for all i 6= j.
Consequently, in (11):
∂αi(t · 1n)
∂ti
=
∂α˜i(k · 1n)
∂ki
∂ki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂α˜k(k · 1
n)
∂kj
∂kj
∂ti
=
∂α˜i(k · 1n)
∂ki
· ∂
∂ti
(ki(t · 1n)− kj(t · 1n)) (12)
∂Φ(t · 1n)
∂ti
=
∂Φ˜(k · 1n)
∂ki
· ∂K(t · 1
n)
∂ti
. (13)
Equation (12) shows that the tax effects on the apportionment share are shaped by the
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behaviour of investment differentials, ki − kj: an increase in the tax rate of a country
reduces that country’s apportionment share if and only if the tax effect on domestic
investment is smaller than on investment in a foreign country, ∂ki/∂ti < ∂kj/∂tj. An
economically plausible case would be that a tax increase in i drives out capital from that
country and into the other countries j 6= i, i.e., ∂ki/∂ti < 0 < ∂kj/∂tj.
Equation (13) conveys that an increase in any tax rate increases [reduces] total taxable
profits if and only if total investments, K, increase [diminish] in response to the tax hike.
This will matter both for the characterization of Nash equilibria and efficient outcomes
below.
4.3 Evolutionary stability
Exploiting the comparative statics of investments with respect to tax rates (see Ap-
pendix A.4), we can obtain a direct characterization of an ESS. Define
D :=
(
∂2Π˜n
∂k2i
− ∂
2Π˜n
∂ki∂kj
)
< 0,
which, as we show in Appendix A.4, is closely related to the tax elasticity of investment
and, thus, measures capital mobility.14
Proposition 5 An interior ESS tE under formulary apportionment is characterized by
1 = −t
EΦ˜
D
n3
(n− 1)2
(
∂α˜i(k1
n)
∂ki
)2
. (14)
To understand why the square of ∂α˜i/∂ki shows up in Proposition 5, recall (12): here,
the change in the relative position for investments, ki− kj, is determined by ∂α˜i/∂ki (see
(A.10) in Appendix A.4). The apportionment method, thus, exerts a double impact: one
direct, via the tax base share, and one indirect, via the investment differential.
14For general, non-symmetric situations, D is defined in (A.7) in Appendix A.4; D denotes the deter-
minant of the Jacobian inverse in the comparative statics of capital investments. In symmetric situations,
it boils down to D, as given here.
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The fraction n3/(n− 1)2 in (14) might irritate at first sight. Consider, however, appor-
tionment formulas of the weight-type (9). Here,
∂α˜i(k1
n)
∂ki
=
1(∑
j g(kj)
)2 ∑
j 6=i
g(kj)g
′(kj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k=k1n
=
n− 1
n2
g′(k)
g(k)
. (15)
In such cases, (14) boils down to
1 = −t
EΦ˜
nD
(
g′(k)
g(k)
)2
. (16)
From (16), the ESS tax rate is higher the less responsive the apportionment formula (as
proxied by g′/g) and the less elastic is capital demand (as proxied by −D−1). These
factors also shape Nash play (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007, Section 3.2); both for
relative and absolute payoff concerns, they reflect that capital tax competition is stiffer
the more elastic the tax base is with respect to tax changes.
From Proposition 1 and Eqs. (12) and (13), similar expressions as (14) can also be de-
rived for efficient outcomes and Nash equilibrium. Given the familiarity of these concepts,
we refrain from discussing them here.
4.4 Separable profits
In much of the literature on FA both economic and taxable profits are assumed to be
additively separable between countries. I.e., there exist functions pi and φ such that
Π˜g(k) =
∑
j
pi(kj) and Φ˜(k) =
∑
j
φ(kj), (17)
where pi(ki) and φ(ki) measure, respectively, economic and taxable profits in country i,
and consolidation simply boils down to adding up. With (17), net profits amount to
Π˜n =
∑
j (pi(kj)− τφ(kj)). In a symmetric situation with tax rate t everywhere, profit-
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maximizing investment (10) in each country is given through
pi′(k)− tφ′(k) = 0. (18)
The SOC requires that
D(k) := pi′′(k)− tφ′′(k)
is negative. We then obtain the following specification of Proposition 1:15
Proposition 6 Suppose that profits are separable and the apportionment method is a
weighing scheme (9). The tax rate and the attending level of investments are jointly
characterized by (18) and, . . .
• in an interior efficient solution t∗, by
0 = φ(k) +
t
D(k)
(
∂φ(k)
∂k
)2
; (19)
• in an interior Nash equilibrium tN , by
0 = φ(k) +
t
nD(k)
[(
∂φ(k)
∂k
)2
+ (n− 1)φ2(k)
(
g′(k)
g(k)
)2]
; (20)
• in an interior ESS tE, by
1 = − t
D(k)
φ(k)
(
g′(k)
g(k)
)2
. (21)
The efficient solution and the ESS are independent of the number of countries, n.
A striking observation in the third item of Proposition 6 is the independence of the ESS
of n:16 irrespective of the number of countries that will share the consolidated tax base,
15The square of ∂φ(k)∂k in (19) and (20) can be explained in a similar way as the square of
∂α˜i
∂ki
in (14). As
shown in (A.11), the tax responsiveness of total investments K depends on the investment responsiveness
of the tax base, Φ˜. Hence, the latter shows up squared in (13).
16Consisting of only two equations each, Proposition 6 provides a convenient recipe to calculate efficient
outcomes, Nash equilibrium, and ESS.
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the outcome under evolutionary play will always be the same. This is in marked contrast
to the Nash equilibrium (see second item in Proposition 6), which generally varies with
n.
The independence of the ESS with respect to the number of players is due to a feature
of evolutionary play that, in large classes of games, it leads to “perfectly competitive”
outcomes (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania, 2005): each of the finitely many players behave as if
there were an infinity of players none of which had any impact on the “aggregates” of the
economy.17 In the separable case, this also holds for tax competition with a CCCTB; it
is currently an open question whether it also holds in the general, non-separable case.
Clearly, Proposition 6 confirms Proposition 4: if any two solutions coincide, then so
does the third. To illustrate Proposition 3, we now provide a worked example for the
separable case.
4.5 A worked example
Suppose that production in each jurisdiction follows a quadratic production function,
f(k) = (B − bk)k,
with B, b > 0; we shall make sure that marginal productivity, B − 2bk, is positive at
any situation that we consider. Assume that the sales price of the multinational’s output
equals one worldwide and that sales equal production. Suppose that the actual costs of
capital are constant and equal r > 0 per unit, and that h · r (with h ≥ 0) are the capital
costs that are tax-deductible in profit taxation. Hence, economic and taxable profits in a
country are given by, respectively,
pig(k) = f(k)− rk and φ(k) = f(k)− h · rk.
17To see that the ESS corresponds to the competitive outcome verify that the ESS condition (21)
coincides with the Nash condition (20) for n→∞.
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Obviously, h < 1 indicates a situation where costs of capital are less than fully tax-
deductible, h > 1 would imply a tax-subsidy on capital costs, and h = 1 corresponds to
“pure” profit taxation.
In a symmetric situation with tax rate t everywhere, net-of-tax profit maximization (18)
leads to
k(t) =
1
2b
(
B − r1− h · t
1− t
)
, (22)
which decreases [increases] with the tax rate whenever h < 1 [resp., h > 1]. We assume
property-share apportionment: αi = ki/K.
Figure 1 depicts, for varying definitions of the tax base (captured by h), the tax rates at
an efficient solution, the ESS, and the Nash equilibria for n = 2 and n = 10 countries.18
Figure 1: Different solutions with CCCTB (B = 5, b = r = 1)
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Ignoring the case h = 1 for the moment, Figure 1 portrays the following messages:
• There exists a situation (at roughly h = 1.12) where efficient outcome, ESS, and
Nash equilibrium (for any n) coincide. This is the “ideal” situation characterized in
Proposition 3.
18Tax rates were calculated from Proposition 6, using the computer algebra system Maxima. The
Maxima source code, which also generates Figure 1, is available from the author.
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• At levels of cost deductibility below this ideal situation (h < 1.12), we observe
t∗ > tN(n) > tE for all n. In line with Proposition 4, the ESS amplifies the
under-taxation that prevails in a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if n′ > n, then
tN(n′) < tN(n) – “standard” tax competition intensifies if the number of countries
increases. By contrast, the ESS is independent of n.
• At values of h above the ideal situation (h > 1.12), we see that tE > tN(n) > t∗ for
all n. The ESS now amplifies the over-taxation in a Nash equilibrium, which again
is in line with Proposition 4. Again, the ESS is independent of n, unlike the Nash
equilibrium tax rate which increases with the number of countries, n.
Finally, let us consider the knife-edge case h = 1. Here, investments (22) are in-
dependent of the tax rate, t. Hence, taxation is essentially lump-sum, and we have
t∗ = tN = tE = 1 (or the largest possible tax rate, t¯). Figure 1 fails to depict this for
Nash equilibria and ESS; the graphs should exhibit a discontinuity here. Observe that
Figure 1 does not contradict any of our results, which are carefully conditioned on interior
solutions.
5 Welfare maximization
Our analysis has so far assumed that governments aim at maximizing tax revenues. Propo-
sition 4 showed that ESS, Nash equilibrium, and efficient outcomes can be ranked. Here
we will illustrate that and how our main insights can be transferred to alternative settings,
at least as long as governments pursue objectives that are somehow related to tax rev-
enues.19 To illustrate this point, let us suppose that governments care for the well-being
of a representative citizen in their countries. The approach is inspired by Pinto (2007),
Wrede (2014) or Matsumoto (2016).
19Nielsen et al. (2010) show that a comparison of Nash-play tax competition under separate account-
ing and under property-share FA basically yields the same results for both revenue- and for welfare-
maximizing governments.
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A citizen in country i derives utility from private consumption, ci, and from a government-
provided good, gi. Assuming identical preferences in all countries, the utility of a citizen
of state i is represented by
Ui = u(ci, gi),
which we assume to be strictly increasing in both arguments, twice differentiable, strictly
quasi-concave and to satisfy the Inada conditions. Individuals finance their private con-
sumption from the net profits of the multinational enterprise, while public consumption
is financed by national revenues from the corporate income tax. Assuming, for symmetry,
that citizens in country i own a share of 1/n of the multinational, private consumption
in i thus amounts to
ci =
Πn
n
.
Public consumption amounts to
gi = Ti = tiαiΦ.
Following the reduced-form approach of Section 2 and imposing the same symmetry as-
sumptions, we directly write utilities as functions of the tax vector. Plugging all relevant
components into the social welfare function then gives governments’ payoffs as
Ui = U(ti; t−i) := u
(
1
n
Πn(t), tiα(ti; t−i)Φ(t)
)
.
Exchanging the Tj by Uj in Definition 1, we can now define symmetric efficient outcome,
symmetric Nash equilibrium and ESS for the welfare game. We then obtain
Proposition 7 Suppose that the symmetric efficient outcome, the symmetric Nash equi-
librium and the ESS are unique in the welfare game with formulary apportionment.
• If tN ≤ t∗, then tE ≤ tN . Conversely, if tN ≥ t∗, then also tE ≥ tN .
• tN ≤ t∗ holds if and only if a tax increase in i worsens the relative fiscal position
of country i, i.e., if the tax revenue differential with respect to any other country
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marginally decreases:
∂(Ti(t
N )−Tj(tn))
∂ti
≤ 0.
The first item of Proposition 7 conveys that evolutionary play amplifies the inefficiencies
of Nash play: both races over the top and to the bottom speed up. This corroborates the
observations of Propositions 3 and 4. The intuition is the same as before: evolutionary
play involves aggregate-taking behaviour. The “aggregate” here is private consumption, c,
which – by the symmetry of the ownership distribution of the multinational – is the same
across countries and, thus, does not matter in relative comparisons. Welfare differentials
between countries can therefore only result from public goods, gi, which are proportional
to tax revenues – this is the message of the second item of Proposition 7. For tax revenues,
Proposition 4 has already ranked outcomes. Echoing Proposition 3, Proposition 7 implies
that equality of Nash equilibrium and ESS is tantamount to efficiency.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Being unprecedented, implementing formulary apportionment in the EU would be a coura-
geous step in the sense that its outcome is hard to predict in advance. Beyond the EU
project, lack of knowledge and the complexity and multitude of spillovers under any sys-
tem of taxation with formulary apportionment might preclude that national tax policies
follow an optimization approach with best response-type of play among countries. Pol-
icy mimicking and occasional innovations, however, remain a viable, even if boundedly
rational way of policy-making.
Together with theoretical results on learning dynamics, this motivates why we study
evolutionary stability of tax competition under formulary apportionment. Our results
suggest the following: innovation-and-imitation dynamics generally do not lead to an
efficient outcome. Rather, they lead further away from efficiency than uncoordinated
best-response play. The direction of this divergence is determined by the sign of fiscal
externalities (i.e., the cross-country revenue effects of tax changes) – on which relatively
much is known from empirical and theoretical studies on formulary apportionment under
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the assumptions of best-response play and full knowledge.
As a first attempt, our analysis rests on a number of critical assumptions. For conclusion,
let us discuss some of them – and the possibilities and consequences of giving them up.
Institutional richness and tax laws. Our models both in Sections 2 and 4 are in-
stitutionally quite abstract. Apportionment formulas and definitions of economic and
taxable profits remained largely unmodelled. Our principal insights hold at this level of
generality. Recent research on the CCCTB has shown, however, that more specific pre-
dictions (e.g., on whether positive or negative fiscal externalities prevail or on the size
of the gap between efficiency, Nash equilibrium and ESS) crucially depend on details in
the definitions of taxable profits and of the factors in the apportionment formula. In the
definition of taxable profits, examples would include the treatment of corporate equity,
(super-)deductions for certain expenditure categories, exempt revenues etc.; in the appor-
tionment factor, the treatment of intangibles, the delineation of domestic capital, payroll
and sales might matter.
Water’s edge. The CCCTB in the recent EU proposal (European Commission, 2016)
will only apply within the EU, implying that traditional transfer pricing and permanent
establishment concepts will still be applied at the “water’s edge”, where EU firms trans-
act with their affiliates outside the EU. In practical terms, this makes it questionable
how effective the CCCTB will be at reducing tax dodging, compared to the status quo
plus nowadays BEPS (Riedel and Runkel, 2007). From this paper’s viewpoint of learning
among governments, water’s edge issues relate to the question of whom precisely play-
ers (governments) include in their set of comparables, when assessing and revising their
policies. Alo´s-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) argue that the distinction between the in-
teraction environment (with whom is one economically connected?) and the information
environment (whom does one observe?) is crucial for the outcome of learning processes.
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Coordinated deviations. The concept of ESS entails stability of a tax policy against
single-player experiments. In general, evolutionary analysis focuses on symmetric sit-
uations where some policy t has spread out to the entire player population, and then
considers strategy profiles of the form
t = (
m
t′, . . . , t′,
n−m
t, . . . , t),
where a number m of players deviate to some other t′ while the other n − m players
stick to the initial t. The initial strategy t is stable against mutations by m players, if
for no simultaneous m-fold mutation to the payoff of a mutant exceeds the payoff of a
non-mutant (evolutionary stability is the case m = 1). If a tax policy resists any number
1 ≤ m 6= n − 1 of mutations, then it is called globally stable. Global stability is a very
stark property, implying that no simultaneous policy experiment can uproot a strategy,
however large the group of experimenters is. Multiple deviations might be relevant for the
EU when groups of member states coordinate their policies. All results in this paper do,
however, hold for any number of mutations; and the reader can replace “evolutionarily
stable” by “globally stable” in all our results.
Learning and knowledge. The evolutionary stability of fiscal interactions is conceptu-
ally inspired by the idea of laboratory federalism and its imitation-with-experimentation
processes. These processes can be modified in various ways (Alo´s-Ferrer and Schlag, 2009);
as long as they entail that the most successful policies will always be copied with positive
probability by other jurisdictions, a policy vector being an ESS [globally stable] is a nec-
essary requirement for being immune against rare [any number of simultaneous] policy
experiments. Hence, if a unique ESS exists, the dynamics need not be spelt out. Oth-
erwise, however, an explicit dynamic analysis is needed. The same holds for alternative
learning processes (with memory or frequency-based imitation, say).
Our model does not make any specific assumptions on what governments actually know.
Also the learning process is not defined in any epistemological terms but – in line with the
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policy diffusion literature – as the act of comparing payoffs and policy imitation. Clearly,
in the course of time governments can be expected to update their priors (however ignorant
they might have been initially) and utilize their state of knowledge in decision making.
Our model could capture this by the way governments choose their policy experiments.
In the imitation dynamics, information beyond payoffs and policies does not play any
role. As Becker and Davies (2015) argue, (Bayesian) updating will eventually lead to
perfect knowledge, allowing for best-response play with deterministic payoffs. Combining
epistemological and behavioural approaches towards learning might be a realistic and
interesting compromise.
Asymmetries. A clearly unrealistic assumption in our paper is that countries are identi-
cal. The assumption is not easily replaced, however. First, tax competition with formulary
apportionment and asymmetric players is notoriously complex to analyze in itself (Wrede,
2014).20 Moreover, imitative learning among asymmetric agents is a conceptually tricky
issue (Alo´s-Ferrer and Schlag, 2009). In laboratory federalism, only few approaches deal
with non-identical jurisdictions (see, e.g., Ania and Wagener, 2014; Philipowski, 2015),
although in quite specific settings. Clearly, there is much scope for future research here.
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Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
• Cooperative solution: The FOC is given by
∂
∂ti
∑
k
Tk =
∂
∂ti
(τΦ) = τ
∂Φ
∂ti
+ Φ
(
αi +
∑
k
tk
∂αk
∂ti
)
= 0.
With symmetry ti = tk = t
∗. Hence αi = 1/n for all i and τ = t∗, too. Since
∂
∂ti
∑
k αk = 0, the above condition boils down to (4).
• Nash equilibrium: The FOC for country i is given by
∂Ti
∂ti
=
∂
∂ti
(Φtiαi) = αiti
∂Φ
∂ti
+ Φ
(
αi + ti
∂αi
∂ti
)
= 0.
Using symmetry yields (5).
• ESS: Partially differentiating Ti − Tj with respect to ti gives:
∂
∂ti
(Ti − Tj) = ∂
∂ti
(Φ(tiαi − tjαj))
= (tiαi − tjαj)∂Φ
∂ti
+ Φ
(
αi + ti
∂αi
∂ti
− tj ∂αj
∂ti
)
= 0.
In a symmetric situation, ti = tj = t as well as αi = αj = 1/n. Given symmetry of
αj in t−j gives that
∂αj(t1
n)
∂ti
= ∂αk(t1
n)
∂ti
for all j, k 6= i. Symmetry also implies that
(2) holds. Using this to replace
∂αj(t1
n)
∂ti
leads to
∂
∂ti
(Ti − Tj)
∣∣∣∣
t=t1n
= Φ
(
αi + t
E ∂αi
∂ti
(
1 +
1
n− 1
))
(A.1)
in any symmetric situation. At the ESS, (A.1) has to equal zero. With Φ > 0, this
requires (6). •
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Calculate the fiscal externality generated by country i on country j as
∂Tj
∂ti
=
∂
∂ti
(Φtjαj) = αjtj
∂Φ
∂ti
+ tjΦ
∂αj
∂ti
.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the αk as well as the tk are equal across countries.
Moreover, (5) holds. Using this to replace ∂Φ
∂ti
gives
∂Tj(t
N1n)
∂ti
= −Φ
(
1
n
+ tN
(
∂αi
∂ti
− ∂αj
∂ti
))
= −Φ
(
1
n
+ tN
n
n− 1
∂αi
∂ti
)
,
where we used (2). Since Φ > 0 by assumption, the claim follows by rearranging. •
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We only outline the case of positive externalities:
∂Tj
∂ti
> 0 for all t; the case of negative
externalities follows mutatis mutandis. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium with positive
externalities, (8) holds. Now use (A.1) to evaluate that at a symmetric Nash equilibrium
∂
∂ti
(Ti − Tj)
∣∣∣∣
t=tN1n
= Φ
1
n− 1
(
1− 1
n
− εα(tN)
)
< 0.
Hence, given uniqueness of the ESS, it must hold that tE < tN . Combining this with
Proposition 2 proves the claim. •
A.4 Comparative statics for Section 4
Approach. Denote by
Jk :=
(
∂2Π˜n
∂ki∂kj
)
i,j=1,...,n
and Jt :=
(
∂2Π˜n
∂ki∂tj
)
i,j=1,...,n
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the square matrices of the derivatives of (10) with respect to capital investments and tax
rates. Then the MNE’s tax responses can be calculated as:
dk = −J−1k · Jtdt. (A.2)
We focus on symmetric situations: ti = t for all i. Then τ = t and αi = 1/n. From (10)
and the symmetry of Φ˜ and Π˜g, investments are the same everywhere: ki = kj. Moreover,
∂τ
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
t=t1n
=
∑
k
tk · ∂α˜k
∂ki
= t
∑
k
∂α˜k
∂ki
= 0,
∂2τ
∂ki∂kj
∣∣∣∣
t=t1n
= t
∂
∂kj
(∑
k
∂α˜k
∂ki
)
= 0.
Matrices Jk and Jt are symmetric, implying from (A.2) that
∂ki(t1
n)
∂ti
=
∂kj(t1
n)
∂tj
and
∂ki(t1
n)
∂tj
=
∂kj(t1
n)
∂ti
for all i 6= j.
Specifically,
∂2Π˜n
∂k2i
=
∂2Π˜g
∂k2i
− τ ∂
2Φ˜
∂k2i
− 2∂Φ˜
∂ki
∂τ
∂ki
− Φ˜∂
2τ
∂k2i
(s)
=
∂2Π˜g
∂k2i
− t∂
2Φ˜
∂k2i
; (A.3)
∂2Π˜n
∂ki∂kj
(s)
=
∂2Π˜g
∂ki∂kj
− t ∂
2Φ˜
∂ki∂kj
; (A.4)
∂2Π˜n
∂ki∂ti
= −∂Φ˜
∂ki
∂τ
∂ti
− Φ˜ ∂
2τ
∂ki∂ti
(s)
= − 1
n
∂Φ˜
∂ki
− Φ˜∂αi
∂ki
; (A.5)
∂2Π˜n
∂ki∂tj
(s)
= − 1
n
∂Φ˜
∂ki
− Φ˜∂αj
∂ki
. (A.6)
Here,
(s)
= indicates that the expression is evaluated at a symmetric situation (ti = t for
all i). Moreover, the values of expressions (A.3) through (A.6) do not vary across i and
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j. Hence, Jk and Jt are of form
Jk
(s)
=

a b . . . b
b a . . . b
...
...
. . .
...
b b . . . a

and Jt
(s)
=

c d . . . d
d c . . . d
...
...
. . .
...
d d . . . c

where a := ∂
2Πn
∂k2i
, b := ∂
2Πn
∂ki∂kj
, c := ∂
2Πn
∂ki∂ti
, and d := ∂
2Πn
∂ki∂tj
. The inverse of Jk is:
J−1k
(s)
=
1
D

a+ (n− 2)b −b . . . −b
−b a+ (n− 2)b . . . −b
...
...
. . .
...
−b −b . . . a+ (n− 2)b

where
D := a2 + (n− 2)ab− (n− 1)b2. (A.7)
Solution. Hence,
∂ki
∂ti
(s)
= − 1
D
(ac+ (n− 2)bc− (n− 1)bd) , (A.8)
∂kj
∂ti
(s)
= − 1
D
(ad− bc) , (A.9)
where a to d need to be replaced by the expressions in (A.3) to (A.6).
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Composite effects. From this we obtain:
∂(ki − kj)
∂ti
(s)
= − 1
D
(a+ (n− 1)b) (c− d) = −c− d
a− b
= −
(
∂2Π˜n
∂k2i
− ∂
2Π˜n
∂ki∂kj
)−1(
−tΦ
(
∂α˜i
∂ki
− ∂α˜j
∂ki
))
= Φ˜ · n
n− 1
(
∂2Π˜n
∂k2i
− ∂
2Π˜n
∂ki∂kj
)−1
∂α˜i
∂ki
< 0. (A.10)
Similarly,
∂K
∂ti
(s)
=
∂ki)
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂kj)
∂ti
(s)
= − 1
D
((a− b)(c+ (n− 1)d)) = −c+ (n− 1)d
a+ (n− 1)b
= − 1
a+ (n− 1)b
[(
1
n
∂Φ˜
∂ki
− Φ˜∂α˜i
∂ki
)
− n− 1
n
∂Φ˜
∂ki
− (n− 1)Φ˜∂α˜j
∂ki
]
= − 1
a+ (n− 1)b
[
−∂Φ˜
∂ki
− Φ˜ ∂
∂ki
∑
j
α˜j
]
=
1
a+ (n− 1)b ·
∂Φ˜
∂ki
=
(
∂2Π˜n
∂k2i
+ (n− 1) ∂
2Π˜n
∂ki∂kj
)−1
· ∂Φ˜
∂ki
. (A.11)
The sign of (A.11) depends on the sign of ∂Φ˜
∂ki
, i.e., on whether taxable profits increase or
decrease with investment, ki. Observe from (10) that, in a symmetric situation,
∂Φ˜
∂ki
∣∣∣∣∣
ti=t
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ∂Φ˜
∂ki
≤ ∂Π˜
g
∂ki
.
Hence, if taxable profits are marginally smaller [larger] than gross, economic profits, then
an increase [a decrease] in any tax rate will lead to a reduction of total investment from
the economic area.
Separability (used in Section 4.4). For the special case that profits are separable
across countries (i.e., Π˜n(k) =
∑
j (pi
g(kj)− τφ(kj)), we get that b = 0. Then (A.10) and
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(A.11) simplify to
∂(ki − kj)
∂ti
= φ · n
n− 1
(
∂2pin
∂k2i
)−1
· ∂α˜i
∂ki
; (A.12)
∂K
∂ti
=
(
∂2pin
∂k2i
)−1
· ∂φ
∂ki
. (A.13)
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Plugging (12) into (6), we find that an interior ESS tE for FA and CCCTB is characterized
by
1 = −tE · n
2
n− 1 ·
∂α˜i(k · 1n)
∂ki
· ∂
∂ti
(ki − kj). (A.14)
Using (A.10) leads to (14). •
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The profit-maximization condition comes from (10), taking into account separability and
the fact that, in a symmetric situation, ∂τ/∂ki = 0.
Observe that with separability, φ = Φ˜/n, ∂φ/∂k = ∂Φ˜/∂ki, and D = pi
′′(k) − tφ′′(k).
The general expressions used in Proposition 1 and its proof can then be simplified, using
Eqs. (12) and (13) as well as (A.10) and (A.11). Moreover, (15) holds for weighing
formulas. Re-arranging terms gives the results, as claimed.21 •
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Verify that
∂Ui
∂ti
=
1
n
∂Πn
∂ti
uc(ci, gi) +
∂Ti
∂ti
ug(ci, gi) and
∂Uj
∂ti
=
1
n
∂Πn
∂ti
uc(cj, gj) +
∂Tj
∂ti
ug(cj, gj).
21Observe that the ESS condition can directly be adopted from (16).
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At a symmetric situation (ti = t for all i), we get ci = c, gi = g, and
∂Πn
∂ti
= ∂Π
n
∂tj
for all
i, j.
Consider now a symmetric Nash equilibrium, tN = tN1n. Here, ∂Ui(t
N )
∂ti
= 0 holds for
any i. Consequently, the cross-country spillovers are given by
∂Uj(t
N)
∂ti
=
1
n
∂Πn(tN)
∂ti
uc(c
N , gN) +
∂Tj(t
N)
∂ti
ug(c
N , gN)
= −ug(cN , gN)
(
∂Ti(t
N)
∂ti
− ∂Tj(t
N)
∂ti
)
.
Since ug > 0, a positive [negative] welfare externality prevails if the tax revenue differential
between i and j marginally decreases [increases] with the tax rate ti.
Assuming uniqueness, we therefore obtain
tN ≤ t∗ ⇐⇒ ∂Ti(t
N)
∂ti
− ∂Tj(t
N)
∂ti
≤ 0. (A.15)
This proves the second item of the claim. By its symmetry, an interior ESS is characterized
by
∂(Ui(t
E)− Uj(tE))
∂ti
= ug(c
E, gE)
(
∂Ti(t
E)
∂ti
− ∂Tj(t
E)
∂ti
)
= 0.
Hence, from (A.15),
tN < t∗ ⇐⇒ ∂Ti(t
N)
∂ti
− ∂Tj(t
N)
∂ti
< 0 =
∂Ti(t
E)
∂ti
− ∂Tj(t
E)
∂ti
⇐⇒ tE < tN .
The converse holds if tN > t∗. This settles the proof. •
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